Army Enterprise Integration Oversight Office (AEIOO)

Strategic Environment Assessment

February 10, 2004

Revisions

Revision	Date	Name	Description
1.0	10-3-03	Greg Davis	Delivery (power point format)
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1.0 Executive Summary

The Army is transforming to a lighter, faster, more lethal force that is highly mobile, modular, and more easily sustainable. The Army's aggressive move towards the Future Force has spearheaded the development of blueprints (enterprise architectures) to prescribe the integration of Army warfighting capability into a joint force. The Chief of Staff is committed to continue the transformation of the Army to make it more able to deliver combat capability as the land component of the Joint Force. He has termed this transformation as ensuring the Army is "Relevant and Ready". The Army Strategic Planning Guidance reports, "The goal of Army transformation is to provide relevant and ready Current Forces and Future Forces organized, trained, and equipped for joint, interagency, and multi-national full spectrum operations. Army transformation occurs within the larger context of continuous change brought about through the interaction of constantly evolving capabilities between Current and Future forces"



To accomplish this transformation in the context of being an Army at war, the recently released Army Strategic Planning Guidance focuses all Army efforts on two core competencies. The Army's core competencies are: **(1) train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders; and (2) provide relevant and ready land power capability to the Combatant Commander as part of the Joint Team**. To focus Army transformation efforts towards supporting Army Strategic Objectives and enabling the core competencies, Army Senior leadership has designated 16 areas that require immediate focus. The analysis of these areas will shape the ongoing development of the Army Campaign Plan.



As a critical component of One Army Enterprise, it is essential that there be both horizontal and vertical integration of enterprise solutions internally across the Army functional domains, and externally between the Army, the other Services, DoD, and other external organizations. To this end, the Secretary of the Army established the Army Enterprise Integration Oversight Office (AEIOO) in March 2003. AEIOO's mission is to integrate enterprise solutions across the Army, DoD, and other external organizations. AEIOO has a three-year charter to integrate Army enterprise solutions across the warfighter support domains and bridging the operational and institutional Army. AEIOO is on an aggressive schedule to develop an enterprise integration strategy, a framework to allow assessment and integration of the many ongoing integration efforts, and a governance structure that will give Army Executive leadership a means to provide oversight and direction for the integration and transformation of Army warfighter support. AEIOO's change management and communications strategy will guide the Army to acceptance and use of these products and eventual internalization of the resulting process changes.

As a means to shape the development of its enterprise integration products, AEIOO performed an assessment of the strategic environment in which enterprise integration and transformation must take

place. This document contains the Strategic Environment Assessment. The Strategic Environment Assessment Identifies:

> **Threats –** Entities or activities that may jeopardize the accomplishment of AEIOO Goals and Objectives
>
> **Trends** – A series of occurrences or activities that influence the accomplishment of AEIOO Goals and Objectives
>
> **Opportunities** – Entities, activities, or occurrences that can be leveraged to facilitate and enable the accomplishment of AEIOO Goals and objectives.

The Strategic Environment Assessment considers integration impacts not only in DoD, but also in the federal government and in private industry to gain sufficient information to develop an effective enterprise integration strategy. From this assessment, AEIOO has determined that there are three critical actions that must be accomplished for the Army to successfully achieve enterprise integration and lasting transformation of the warfighter support processes. They are:

- The establishment of; a federated governance structure that empowers Army leaders to deliver Army critical capabilities,
- An enterprise integration strategy that integrates warfighter support processes into a One Army Enterprise, and:
- A change management and communications strategy that incorporates process integration and transformation into Army plans such as the Army Campaign Plan and ensures that those transformed processes become an inherent part of how the Army works.

2.0 Introduction

Enterprise Integration starts with Transformation. For several years now the Army has been on the path to transformation with the vision for the Future Force. The Chief of Staff's vision remains consistent with the Secretary of Defense's transformation planning guidance and transformation goals. The Army Secretary and Chief of Staff have stressed the importance of instantaneous information in realizing those goals and achieving the full spectrum dominance in the asynchronous threat environment that the Army faces. Army forces must operate not only in a Joint environment, but also, as we have seen lately, in a coalition or multi-national environment as well. To successfully execute concepts such as Network Centric Warfare and Decision Superiority, there must be a complete end-to-end understanding of the Army as a single enterprise, including the warfighter support processes that generate and sustain the warfighting capabilities of the operational Army. Warfighter support (often referred to as business) embodies all the people, processes, systems, and material that provide the means for warfighters to conduct combat and contingency operations.

With the vision for our operational mission established, we must focus equal attention on the transformation of our warfighter support processes, organizations, and systems. We need to establish and institutionalize true end-to-end processes - traditionally referred to as factory to foxhole - to ensure our warfighting mission is optimized by our warfighter support processes. Achievement of this goal requires clear objectives, precise performance standards, strong senior leadership visibility and involvement, bottom-up innovation, and continual oversight.

The Strategic Environment Assessment is a critical tool for development of the Army Enterprise Integration Strategy. This first draft of the Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) has an "outward" looking perspective. That is, identifying what in AEIOO's external environment must be addressed in the enterprise integration strategy to enable the accomplishment of its goals and objectives. By keeping an eye on the environment and continually assessing AEIOO's position, we will develop an effective enterprise integration strategy. The strategy that we will build will leverage AEIOO's strengths and take advantage of environmental opportunities and trends, while mitigating any weaknesses and environmental threats.

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to enable the understanding of the strategic environment; the threats, trends, and opportunities impacting the success of the AEIOO. Together these topics comprise the strategic environment assessment and lay the foundation for the Army enterprise integration strategy.

2.2 The Army Vision

General Schoomaker has outlined the vision for the future of the Army:

"…We will retain our dominance on land providing the combatant commander with agile, versatile, and strategically responsive forces completely integrated and synchronized with other members of the joint and interagency team and with our coalition partners. As a part of that team of teams, our prompt,

sustained, and decisive land combat power complements naval and air power to create a synergy that is greater than the sum of the parts.

We are a critical component of this Joint Team. The Army does not fight alone, and achieving joint interdependence must dominate all future aspects of the Army's culture, structure, and operations.

To gain direction into the future, we will train our Soldiers and leaders with the capabilities that we know are required. And we will educate them so that they are flexible and adaptable to deal with the uncertainty in any future environment."

- CSA Remarks (As Prepared): AUSA Eisenhower Luncheon Speech, October 7, 2003

Being a nation at war provides urgency and focus for the Army's transformation to the Future Force. The soldiers in Iraq need the Future Force NOW!



Figure 1: The Army Vision

To meet our national security needs as a member of a joint force, the Army must be capable of delivering effective, sustained combat power any place, at anytime. Failure to ensure this capability will cause the National Command Authority to be forced to trade the Army's force effectiveness for less optimal alternatives that can be more readily employed. This is what being an Army that is *Relevant and Ready* is about.



Figure 2: Army Core Competencies

2.2.1 Transforming from the Current to the Future Force

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance states that the goal of Army Transformation is to provide relevant and ready Current Forces and Future Forces organized, trained, and equipped for joint, interagency, and multi-national full spectrum operations. Figure 3 depicts the strategy that will transition the Army from the Current to the Future Force.



Figure 3: Army Transformation Vision

As defined in the Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Current Force is the operational Army today. The Future Force is the operational force the Army continuously seeks to become. The Army must continue to develop Future Forces while simultaneously spiraling-in Future Force capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of the Current Force.

2.2.2 Transformation Immediate Focus Areas

Senior Army leadership has reviewed the myriad of Army requirements, capabilities and transformation opportunities, mapped them against our national security needs. In the recently released Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the Army has selected the areas that demand immediate attention by Army transformation efforts. These 16 areas, referred to as the *Immediate Focus Areas*, are described in Figure 4. They will serve as the basis for strategic planning now and in the immediate future. The Immediate Focus Areas will support the Army Strategic Objectives and enable the Army's core competencies. The Army core competencies are:

- Train and Equip Soldiers and Grow Leaders
- Provide Relevant and Ready Land Power Capability To the Combatant Commander and the Joint Team

The Soldier – Developing flexible, adaptive and competent Soldiers infused with the Army's Warrior Culture

The Bench – Prepare future generations of senior leaders. Identify, select, prepare, and assign leaders into key positions

The Network – Leverage and enable interdependent, network-centric warfare

Joint and Expeditionary Mindset – Retain our campaign qualities while developing a joint and expeditionary warfare mindset

AC/RC Balance – Align AC/RC within the current security context. Redesign the force to reduce involuntary reserve component mobilizations for the first 15 days of an operation and predictably deploy reserve component forces not more than one year in six.

Modularity – Create modular, capabilities-based unit designs

Force Stabilization – Transition to an improved manning system that places greater emphasis on building and sustaining cohesive, deployable, combat-ready units for Combatant Commanders

Combat Training Center / BCTP – Focus training at CTC and BCTP to meet requirements of current context and the Joint and Expeditionary Team

Leader Development and Education – Train and educate Army members of the Joint and Expeditionary Team

Army Aviation – Take a holistic view of Army Aviation and its role on the Joint Battlefield

Installations as our Flagships – Enhance installation ability to project power and support families

Current to Future Force – Accelerate fielding of select Future Force capabilities to enhance effectiveness of Current Force.

Resource Processes – Redesign resource processes to be flexible, responsive and timely

Strategic Communications – Tell the Army Story so that the Army's relevance and direction are clearly understood and supported

Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountability – Clarify authorities, resources and accountability

Actionable Intelligence – Rapidly implement a system that provides intelligence to commanders with speed, accuracy and confidence to impact current and future operations

Figure 4: Army Transformation Immediate Focus Areas

3.0 The Strategic Environment Assessment

The strategic environment assessment is focused on accomplishing the AEIOO mission, Goals, and Objectives.

3.1 AEIOO Mission and Goals:

Mission:

On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, the Army Enterprise Integration Oversight Office provides top-level policy, guidance, and direction in the definition, design, implementation, and integration of enterprise solutions across the Army and between Department of Defense (DOD), the Army and other external organizations.

-AEIOO charter, 16 April 03 Goals:

- Support Army transformation objectives for the institutional and operational Army, across all functional domains, through enterprise integration
- Develop an end to end strategy and provide governance for the integrated development of Army-wide functional ERP, enterprise architecture, and enterprise integration initiatives, projects, programs, systems, and services
- Ensure all ERP-related transformation, enterprise application, institutional process modernization, integration architecture, and architecture development projects are coordinated, including costs, schedules, performance measures, quality and sustainment
- Support executive decision-making on enterprise and ERP integration and institutional process change through the identification of metrics and data repositories

3.2 Development of the Army Enterprise Integration Strategy

The Strategic Environment Assessment enables an understanding of the dynamic forces that must be addressed by the Army Enterprise Integration Strategy. Figure 5 summarizes the development process for the enterprise integration strategy. The enterprise integration strategy lays out the “To Be” state of the integrated, One Army Enterprise. The SEA was conducted from the perspective of the accomplishment of AEIOO goals and objectives and identifies priorities and touch points for the integration strategy. The Preliminary Strategy Checkpoint will provide current observations and recommendations, initial transformation guidance to support the development of an integrated vision, strategy, integration framework, and communications and change management plan. It provides the roadmap for realizing enterprise integration.



Figure 5: Development of the Enterprise Integration Strategy

The Strategic Environment Assessment Identifies:

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4.0 Threats

Response to the Global Environment

- Over time, warfighter support transformation will compete major priorities
- Warfighting and Major contingency operations
- Response to global economic strife
- Peacekeeping

Realizing The Army Warfighter Support Transformation

- Increasingly restrictive oversight and regulation by Congress and DoD
- Lack of evidence of a warfighter support transformation that is coordinated across the Army enterprise
- Disjointed warfighter support transformation efforts across DoD and the Army
  - Lack of clarity of responsibilities and boundaries
  - Unsynchronized planning and implementation
  - Lack of a clear governance structure or coordination framework to guide OSD, the other Services, and Agencies' Warfighter Support Transformation and Integration Executive Agents as they develop strategies, write policies, and implement transformation initiatives.
  - Varying stages of maturity of the structures to plan and oversee transformation implementation by the functional Domains at OSD and the Army
- Lack of budget authority and a role in the budget building, acquisition, and policy development process for the Executive Agents for transformation of institutional processes.
- The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) is too restrictive to facilitate rapid response to changes in requirements and technology
- Zero-based budget for transformation of warfighter support processes
- Adherence to schedule becomes the driving performance measure for warfighter support process transformation efforts versus optimized support to the Future Force
- Leadership vacancies, changes, turnover and shortage of the skills and subject matter expertise to plan and execute complex transformation
- Organizational cultures and traditional resistance to change
- Wide disparity in infostructure across the Army impairs delivery of capabilities and adoption of solutions

Balancing Enterprise Capabilities and Operational Requirements

- Lack of comprehensive change management strategies to plan, coordinate and communicate changes to warfighter support processes and systems while meeting operational requirements
- Unwillingness, inability to retire legacy systems because of the perception that retirement will result in a permanent loss of capabilities
- Too much focus on technology and information technology (IT) solutions versus up front planning and implementation of enterprise capabilities and end-to-end resource generation and sustainment approaches
- Warfighter support domains not forced to demonstrate relevance, readiness and synchronization to the warfighting domains
- Customization of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) versus reengineering practices
- Lack of operational architectures across the Army
- Lack of consensus on integrated process at the enterprise (Army) level to provide guidance and track transformation progress in the operational and institutional Army
- Increasing complexity and costs of enterprise integration due to interim solutions and work-arounds

4.1 Response to the Global Environment

There is a clear and compelling need to transform the Department of Defense to address the ever-changing and increasingly ominous security environment we face. DoD leadership is fully committed to that transformation, even in the face of increasing demands on critical resources to meet operational requirements. Despite the need and the leadership commitment to transformation, there remains a threat that responses to the global environment will diminish emphasis and critical resources with the ultimate effect on the timing and effectiveness of the Department's transformation efforts.

The threat of derailment of transformation due to global events is compounded for the transformation of enterprise warfighter support process solutions. In July 2001, The Secretary of Defense established the Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP – formerly, the Financial Management Modernization Program) to plan and oversee transformation of DoD's warfighter support (business) processes. While BMMP has made significant progress, it is clear from the experiences gained thus far in the transformation that it is an exceptionally difficult task that, despite Herculean efforts on the part of best and brightest in DoD, and will require a significant investment in time, talent, and funds to complete. For example, the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) is only the first and top level of the DoD business architecture. The DoD functional domains (Accounting and Finance, Strategic Planning and Budgeting, Acquisition, Human Resources Management, Logistics, Installations and Environment, and Technical Infrastucture) have the responsibility to develop architectures that further refine and detail the DoD warfighter support processes. These domain efforts are, in some cases, in their infancy and will require significant time and effort to identify required resources for architecture development and

establish governance structures and procedures. The enormous amount of work still to be done and the anticipated cost increases the likelihood that in the current environment, resources committed to transformation will be prioritized to efforts that more directly and immediately impact combat and combat support.

We have not yet seen compelling evidence of "derailment" of the enterprise warfighter support transformation. In fact, there are several efforts throughout DoD that have been and continue to receive resources. Our recognition of the threat will result in analysis and decisions on the efforts that are the most important to achieving the Army's strategic objectives.

4.2 Realizing The Army Warfighter Support Transformation

As previously mentioned, there is a clear need and commitment to transforming the Army and DoD. There are however, many threats to the realization of the desired transformation.

1. There is a threat that over-regulation of the Army's warfighter support transformation will hinder its ability to maintain an effective balance between regulatory compliance and operational requirements. It is clear that our most senior leadership is growing increasingly impatient with the pace of DoD's warfighter support transformation. This impatience is causing Congress and DoD to take a more active and directive role. PL 107-314 and the establishment of the BMMP by the Secretary of Defense are indicative of an environment that will present increasing oversight and regulation of transformation efforts. While it is best practice in industry to transform from the top down, the regulatory environment, structure, and mission of DoD necessitates very careful design and implementation of oversight and regulation. The approach and framework by which BMMP is assessing IT investments for compliance with the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) is evidence that more care must be taken in regulation of transformation implementation. Thus far, Army programs using the compliance framework have found that it requires a significant increase in workload, but does not provide a clear understanding of the benefit. For example, it was reported that the Standard Procurement System Program (SPS) Management Office expended approximately 800 unplanned man-hours over one week to demonstrate BEA compliance to gain approval to expend $5 million. Without question, Army transformation efforts must demonstrate compliance with BEA as directed by OSD. However, there must be improved coordination between OSD, the Army, and Army program/initiative managers to prevent negative impacts on costs and schedules.
2. There is no clear Army governance structure to insure that transformation decisions are rendered from the Army enterprise perspective. Experience has shown that effective governance is absolutely critical to successful transformation. A guiding principle of effective governance is that it is organized and executed as a single integrated hierarchical structure with enterprise strategies, standards and measures. The transformation executives and their offices within the Army and OSD have outstanding leaders who are placed in positions to have executive oversight over organizational activities and to influence the organizational leadership. However, a key shortcoming of the existing governance environment is that their real influence over transformation activities appears to be mitigated due to their lack of budget and acquisition authority or a significant role in the budget development process. To implement effective governance, there are numerous Army Staff and Army MACOM sponsored transformation offices whose missions, plans, and efforts must be integrated and synchronized with other transformation offices, Army programs and budget guidance to accomplish Army transformation objectives. For example:

- TRADOC has a significant role in implementation of Army transformation and serves as the lead for several of the Immediate Focus areas. The Futures Center has been established by TRADOC to guide its transformation efforts. However, it is not yet clear how TRADOC's efforts will effect warfighter support transformation or whether there is a purposeful linkage between Army Transformation focus areas and warfighter support transformation efforts. For some time, warfighter support transformation has been a critical component of the Army's transformation. However, being implied in the 16 focus areas rather than articulated as an Immediate Focus Area presents a threat that the many on-going warfighter support transformation efforts will be disjointed and only casually integrated.
- The current political and economical environments of the Human Resources Command (HRC) and the four Human Relations (HR) sub-domains, with separate leadership, budgeting processes, policies and procedures, human resources and payroll systems, will increase the complexity of delivering a single source of data. On 18 February 2003, the Department of Defense (DoD) kicked off a major transformation initiative to dramatically change the purpose and content of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). This is one of several transformational efforts ongoing in the acquisition domain without the benefit of a clear transformation executive agent and / or agency to coordinate strategy and implementation.
- There are several large-scale logistics programs in varying life-cycle phases with possible overlapping scope (LMP, GCSS-A/GCSS, BSM, PLM+) and functionality.
- In addition to the challenges that the Army must face in establishing the necessary governance structure, there is a threat that the leadership necessary to execute governance will not be effective due to vacancies, high rates of personnel turn-over, and the diffused organizational placement/authority of transformation executives. Two examples of critical transformation leadership vacancies and high-turn-over are that BMMP has recently selected a Program Manager after almost a yearlong vacancy and Congress has not yet confirmed a new Secretary of the Army.

3. Integration of enterprise warfighter support solutions is highly dependent upon the infostructure in which it executes. The term "infostructure" is a realization by the Army that the communications requirements have long since bypassed voice transmission alone. Though the Army is addressing the problem, it has been recognized that there is a significant bandwidth shortfall to meet Army operational support requirements. A Congressional Budget Office Study completed in August 2003 yielded the following conclusions regarding the bandwidth available to operations officers. First, at all levels of command within the Army, the current demand for bandwidth is larger than the supply—shortfalls of as much as an order of magnitude (or up to 10 times the amount of supply) are possible. Second, shortfalls in the supply of bandwidth will persist at some command levels through at least 2010, when the capabilities associated with the Army's transformation are beginning to be put into the field. Thus, after what is now planned as an investment of approximately $20 billion in new communications equipment, the Army will fall short of its goals at certain command levels by an order of magnitude.

4.3 Balancing Enterprise Capabilities and Operational Requirements

We are now an Army at war. It is easily understood and traditionally expected that during this time, satisfying operational requirements far outweigh the movement towards implementation of enterprise-

wide capabilities that provide end-to-end solutions. Many in the Army now realize, however, that the rationale currently employed to avoid or sub-optimize warfighter support processes is the same one that has been used throughout the Army to build specialized applications and systems. There is a threat that warfighter support transformation based on enterprise integration will be significantly hampered by the proliferation of localized solutions that are born out of frustration with increasingly complex, lengthy and burdensome enterprise warfighter support processes.

Current examples of problematic enterprise warfighter support processes may illustrate the obstacles to achieving the Army enterprise end-to-end solutions:

- A recently concluded study by the Logistics Management Institute of Army logistics systems found that approximately 59% were MACOM-unique. This situation presents the near certain potential for duplication of capabilities and a significant lack of process integration.
- For many years, the enterprise integration battle cry has been the use of COTS applications. While COTS is in fact a viable solution, the customization of COTS products can often subvert the best practice of procuring COTS solutions. For example, the development and fielding of the SPS program was intended to implement a standardized COTS acquisition and procurement solution. Instead, significant customization to satisfy operational requirements has caused SPS to be in development for seven years without a fully fielded solution, placed SPS on a strategic pause, and threatened the program with cancellation several times.

The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) has not been fielded due to the extensive length of time it has been in requirements definition and design stages. Interim system solutions include eMILPO and ITAPdb. All Army MACOMs and HQDA proponents have been tasked to submit migration plans (together with migration strategy/sunset) on all legacy systems supporting military personnel systems and functions. The systems integration contract was awarded to Northrop Grumman in September 2003. Current plans are that DIMHRS will be fielded in the Army first.

5.0 Trends

Operations

- Joint and combined operations
- Multi-national and coalition
- Multi-Component Operations - "One Army"
- Contingency Operations
- High Tempo – sustainment of peace and war operations, prepare for contingency and war operations simultaneously
- Focus on “Common Operating Picture”, asset visibility, enabling sustainment in motion
- Peacekeeping

Industry

- Detailed business cases for IT expenditures
- Web-enabled systems to optimize processes
- Using standardized, end to end processes
- Branching out beyond ERP Systems
- Outsourcing (warfighter support process outsourcing and IT)
- Accelerated Solutions Delivery
- Increased use of Capital/Investment Management to guide expenditure of funds
- Consistent enterprise-wide look and feel (website, branding)
- Business Process Management/BPMS
- Mobilizing the enterprise
- Partnering

Public Sector

- Increased regulation and oversight of transformation activities
- Emphasis on business transformation (horizontally and vertically)
- Increasing cost of services
- Use of industry best practices
- Renewed interest in outsourcing public sector work to the private sector
- Homeland Security

Performance Measurement/Metrics

- Use of benchmarks and standards established by associations and trade groups that have extensive involvement and knowledge in functional domains
- Assessment and Certification of compliance with established practices and standards
- Strategic Readiness System

Leverage Model (tooth to tail integration)

- Unburden the Operational Commander
- Rationalizing and fencing support funding

Enterprise Integration

- Net-Centric operations
- Use of COTS/ERPs/Enterprise Application Integration (EAI)
- Use of Enterprise Architecture/Frameworks
- Cross functional and end-to-end development/implementation
- Executive sponsorship/leadership involvement in transformation decision structure
- Manage system transitions using business cases to determine the value proposition of what is retained and what is eliminated
- Secure information and privacy
- Sharing of scarce/excess/unused capacity
- Collaboration

5.1 Operations



- **Sequential**, contiguous, linear operations
- **Fight after buildup** at major ports and airports
- **Coordination** thru terrain management / plans; intelligence by contact and direct observation
- **Attrition** of enemy forces with massed formations
- **Large logistical tail** with large footprint forward
- **Deconflicted Joint** operations
- **Generating Force** focus on mobilization, deployment support, and equipment modernization

- **Simultaneous,** distributed, non-continuous operations
- **Fight on arrival** at multiple austere entry points
- **Self-synchronization** thru shared, enhanced situational awareness from global and robust Joint C2 and intelligence
- **Directly attack center of gravity** with precision effects
- **Small logistics footprint** reachback
- **Interdependent Joint Operations** that achieve rapid defeat by dislocation and disintegration
- **Generating Force** conducts force protection, critical node security, and force management for prompt and sustained operations

Figure 6: Transformation of Army Combat Operations

The Army, as a key partner in the Joint Team, remains fully engaged throughout the globe in fulfilling its responsibilities to national security. Additionally, the most salient aspect of the current security environment is that we are a Nation and an Army at war – a war unlike any we have experienced in our history. As the National Security Strategy makes clear, "the enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism –- premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents." This war is being conducted across the globe and throughout the full range of military operations against rogue states and terrorists who cannot be deterred, but nevertheless must be prevented from striking against the United States, our allies, and our interests. The current conflict did not begin on September 11th, 2001, and unlike the great wars of the last century, the sort of tangible events that so publicly signaled the end of World War II and the Cold War may not mark its conclusion.

Figure 6 shows how combat operations are changing. The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) describes how the Joint Force intends to operate within the next 15 to 20 years. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities. The JOpsC provides the conceptual framework to guide future joint operations and joint, Service, combatant command and combat support defense agency concept development and experimentation. The JOpsC also provides the foundation for the development and acquisition of new capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF**).**

In the past, the construct of force development was requirements-driven based upon specific threats. However, the United States cannot predict with confidence the nations, combinations of nations, or non-state actors that may pose threats to its interests, allies or friends. To mitigate the risk of this uncertainty, the United States must anticipate the range of broad capabilities that any adversary might employ and the necessary capabilities required to resolve any conflict or crisis. Thus, a capabilities-based approach shifts this construct from threat-based force development to force planning based on a set of desired capabilities for any given military operation. These desired capabilities are derived from a set of **joint operating concepts**, describing how the future force will operate within specified segments of the range of military operations (ROMO) and a set of **joint functional concepts** that describe the desired capabilities within each functional area across the ROMO.

By developing more modular, strategically responsive organizations and cultivating and institutionalizing a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset throughout the force, the Army will greatly increase the Combatant Commander's ability to rapidly defeat any adversary or control any situation across the full range of military operations. Modular, capabilities-based forces will better support Combatant Commander requirements by more effectively enabling the delivery of the right Army capabilities at the right place and time. This is central to optimizing the relevance of Army forces to the Combatant Commander and expanding the Joint Team's ability to rapidly deploy, employ and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace in any environment and against any opponent.

Battle Command capabilities must be leveraged to enable interdependent network-centric warfare, supported by sense-and-respond logistics capabilities, within joint, interagency, and multinational full spectrum operations. The Army must accelerate the Future Force network to enhance the Joint Battle Command capabilities of the Current Force. We must analyze the development of current network architecture and supporting systems. We will re-prioritize development of the Network to focus on top-down fielding to the Current Force. Experiences and lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom will be leveraged to enhance Joint Battle Command, including battle command on the move, continuous operations over extended distances, blue force tracking capabilities, and logistics connectivity for select Current Force units. Fielding must be linked to unit rotation plans. The Army will partner with Joint Forces Command in all aspects of network development.

The Army is still determining how the enhanced communications and command and control capabilities will be employed within the Army's new organizational construct of modular, brigade sized tactical units of action synchronized and integrated by higher echelon units of employment. There are already plans to reshape Army signal units "to be more flexible and agile to support small unit operations and the types of environments we operate in, yet to still be able to do the larger operations if needed". It will involve organizational as well as equipment changes. The units are now designed to support divisions and corps, which are not typically sent for operations less than major war. The signal units will be equipped with a new tri-band terminal mounted on a HMMWV that can access military and commercial satellites.

As a leader in the Army's charge for decision dominance in the future, LTG. Johnny Riggs, the director of the Objective Force Task Force (now combined with the Futures Center), explained the thinking behind joint force integration; "We are not merely looking for joint interoperability," Riggs said. "Joint interoperability is when everyone builds their own things, brings them to the party and then makes them interoperable with what everyone else brings. We've always designed our Army with all our organic capabilities within it, but we don't have the interdependency we need for the future force. Interdependency is what we want to strive for; that is, depending on what other services bring to the table and linking those capabilities through networks that tie it all together."

"The new way of war is dominant situational awareness," Riggs said. "We owe soldiers a collaborative environment that makes systems responsive from whatever service they originate...This is about having the knowledge of what soldiers need and being able to do something about it. If we don't mature this technology to our advantage, you can bet our adversaries will. And unless we engineer the technology into our systems and then link those systems together with education, doctrine, learning, we ain't got nothin'."

5.2 Industry

Army Transformation to a lean, agile, capabilities-based Future Force continues at an accelerated pace, even as the Army is at war. This transformation is all encompassing – impacting not only the operational, but also the institutional Army. This means a transformation of the Army's warfighter support practices - improving them and increasing effectiveness - will ultimately increase the Army's readiness.

1. The Army's transformation is remarkably similar to the transformation that many of the nation's largest businesses are undergoing. Just as America's businesses have developed transformation strategies supplemented by policies and plans in order to meet the demands of changing markets, so has the Army developed its strategy to transform to meet the constantly changing threats to our National Security and ensure its readiness:

   "To merely upgrade or modify legacy components based on current fiscal metrics cannot resolve or take into account the vast number of inputs that a new environment demands. The trend in warfare is no different than the trend in the commercial marketplace - mitigation of risk by hedging against uncertainty, brought about by rapid dynamic changes. While the losses, both in life and fiscally, are disproportionate to losses in any single business endeavor, the perceived calamity and the strategies to succeed in solving individual problems remain the same - the valuation of flexibility and the creation of options."

   Cmdr. Greg Glaros, Transformation Strategist, Office of Force Transformation, 6 June 2003

2. Many commercial businesses have started to require a compelling business justification for an IT or business change. This is difficult because the costs of the proposed investment are usually relatively straightforward to determine, but in most instances the benefits are more difficult to evaluate, as they comprise a mixture of financial and non-financial benefits, tangible and intangible. This difficulty is compounded when a number of options are under consideration, and the benefits of each option have to be compared.

   A well-presented Business Case allows the business to make informed choices from a prioritized set of options, confident that the costs are realistic, and that the benefits have been identified, targeted, and can be delivered from the proposed work. The business case model will typically prove (or disprove) the case for change by using a:

   - A framework and set of skills aimed at helping clients to make better investment decisions
   - A process to simplify decision making by evaluating benefits, clarifying underlying assumptions, identifying key business drivers and highlighting risks
   - A pragmatic approach that is scaleable in line with the size and nature of the potential investment

3. Key business processes are transformed through the implementation of best practices and COTS applications to enhance business results. Enterprise solutions are selected and implemented based on functional requirements defined using horizontally and vertically integrated operational and system architectures that support business operations regardless of their mission, and geographic location.
4. Technology is a major enabler for improving financial processes. Data warehouses are used to store, retrieve, and analyze large quantities of data. Additionally, the Internet is being used for collaboration and self-service. Networks (voice and data) are enabling users to be virtual and not tied to a location or a single infrastructure.
5. In commercial transportation, new collaborative carrier bid optimization tools are available to effectively drive down carrier's costs and rates, not just to reverse auction, but as a means to better carrier asset utilization and lower carrier costs. Online Reverse auctions are fixed-duration bidding events hosted by a single buyer, in which multiple suppliers compete for business. They are conducted with invited, registered bidders via the internet. Proponents claim reverse auctions can lower the cost of procuring products and services as much as 20 percent, making them the e-business application of choice for companies faced with declining sales and margins.
6. Enterprises are seeking the means to extend corporate data to an increasingly mobile workforce. IDC, a leading computing industry watchdog, estimates that the U.S. mobile work force - defined as employees spending at least 20% of their time away from the office - will be at 55 million in 2004, up from 39 million in 2000.

   Wireless productivity applications leverage and extend corporate data and enterprise applications for workers on the move. Leading companies enable anywhere access to employees who are out of the office (and in the office), ensure real time communication of action items that require immediate attention, and provide a more efficient means to bring products and services to market. In addition, many corporations are embarking on wireless initiatives designed to further embrace customers - from business travelers to students.

   Examples of Mobile Enterprise Solutions:

   - Mobile Office - Corporate email systems have become the foremost communication system in the enterprise, surpassing voicemail in importance. In addition, the number of daily tasks employees are expected to perform is trending upward, while the time per task is trending downward.
   - Enterprise Applications - Many companies justify wireless initiatives by enabling revenue-generating Field Sales and Field Service personnel. Wireless extensions of back-end data leverage investments in enterprise applications such as Sales Force Automation (SFA) software to provide customer history, product specifications, pricing and availability, terms and conditions, and competitive information.
   - Web content - Corporations can mobilize intranet and Internet content to employees and customers alike. Intranet mobilization enables remote employees to be more productive and feel less detached. Wirelessly extending Internet content helps corporations further embrace customers and consumers strengthening brand loyalty and establishing competitive advantage.
   - News, Alerts & Notifications - The ability to push messages to wireless data users is generating business benefits - both internally to employees, and externally to customers. From couponing applications to consumers, to staff-wide messages from the executive team, wireless messaging applications are increasing in popularity.

- Mobile Commerce - Naturally, wireless solutions that generate revenue are among the most compelling applications. The concept of using wireless as an additional revenue stream spurred the explosion in wireless technology and is helping sustain the momentum for many enterprise wireless initiatives.

5.3 Public Sector

Almost without exception, every administration in recent history has sought to change the way government works. These efforts are driven by the fact that many take the view that government is more about the process then the efficient delivery of service to citizens; its customers. Congress has adopted the behavior of attempting to force government transformation through legislation. In recent years, the passage of laws such as the Government Performance Reporting Act (GPRA) and the Clinger-Cohen Act, and implementation of the President's Management Agenda have called government agencies to task to improve the quantity and quality of their services while reducing the cost.

The Office of Management and Budget reported in its FY 2003-2008 Mid-Session review that as a result of a number of factors, including weaker than anticipated economic growth in tax receipts and additional spending for the war on terror, the 2003 deficit is now estimated at $455 billion, up from the $304 billion deficit estimated in February. The number is projected to increase to $475 billion in 2004. The budget pressures resulting from the increasing costs of providing the services those citizens depend on and demand is placing new emphasis and urgency on efforts to transform the government bureaucracy.



Figure 7: OMB Report on Government Spending - FY 2001-2004

Because of the criticality of its mission and the enormous cost, DoD is under heavy scrutiny. Figure 7 shows that spending on defense and security has been increasing presumably at the expense of other domestic priorities. Recent poles reveal that the public is satisfied with actions to insure our security, but

is becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the administration's performance on other domestic issues. The tremendous increase in military requirements coupled with the administration's desire to cut the budget deficit in half by 2006, makes transformation of DoD a critical, foregone conclusion. DoD must find ways to get more combat capability while holding the line on budgets and force structure. Congress knows this and has been aggressively passing legislation to guide and even accelerate the progress of the DoD transformation. Despite the fact that defense budget authority has been increasing, it can be concluded that the added pressure of additional, unprogrammed funding to support the war on terror, homeland security, and Operation Iraqi Freedom will most certainly cause lawmakers and regulators to increasingly force DoD's hand to look very closely for efficiencies and funding from within. Very specific and directive legislation such as Section 1004 of Public Law 107-314 (*National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003*) will become the norm as patience wears thin for DoD's transformation efforts to yield actual savings.

5.4 Performance Measurement / Measures

"We will continue to focus on getting results from federal spending. A federal program's measure of success is not its size, but the value it delivers. And my budget will focus on this goal in a new and important way. If federal programs cannot show results, they should be overhauled, or retired".

- President George Bush, FY 2004 Budget Statement

Prior to the establishment of the President's Management Agenda, most government agencies were not held accountable for the performance of their programs, and funding and management decisions rarely took performance information into account. Over the past two years, OMB has identified the five management areas it believes are most in need of improvement. They are, Strategic Management of Human Capital, Competitive Sourcing, Improved Financial Performance, Expanded Electronic Government, and Budget and Performance Integration. OMB has worked with agencies to clarify their specific management improvement opportunities, establish accountability, develop useful management tools, demonstrate what is possible, and establish mutually agreed-upon, aggressive milestones to achieve success.

The Strategic Readiness System (SRS) is the framework The Army has adopted to transform into a **strategy-focused organization** based on Balanced Scorecard Methodology. It is not intended to make The Army a business, but rather to ensure that we establish a clear linkage between our strategic objectives and our actions and decisions. The heart of SRS is establishment of strategic *objectives* (ends), development of *initiatives* (ways) to meet those objectives, and *measures* to predict future performance while monitoring past execution. *Targets* for measures inform leaders how well the initiatives are working and act as decision points for strategic decisions involving *resources* (means). Figure 8, displays the Army Strategy Map. This annex identifies Strategic Objectives for the SRS and provides supporting objectives with links to Army initiatives underway to achieve these objectives.



Figure 8: Army Strategic Map

The SRS assists leaders in focusing on strategic ends, ways and means with the assistance of a Balanced Scorecard approach – a process analogous to Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) development in tactical organizations. A Balanced Scorecard approach requires organizations to think about and institutionalize their core competencies, and to use metrics to measure progress toward achieving strategic objectives. The SRS will enable leaders to monitor and *forecast* strategic performance. The Army Strategy Map, our institutional scorecard, is aligned with the Army Strategic Objectives described in this annex. The SRS will, therefore, assist us in successfully executing the TAP by providing a mechanism for ensuring we stay on azimuth toward our strategic objectives. The SRS will identify for senior leaders when objectives, concepts, and resources require adjustment so that the Army can efficiently and effectively accomplish its enduring mission for the nation. Finally, the SRS enables the Army's senior leaders to improve the accountability of the Army for its forecast results, and make adjustments as necessary, in resources, personnel assignments, and policy direction.

The Enterprise Integration Strategy will incorporate performance measures in the integration governance and framework that will inform Senior Army leadership on the progress of transformation and performance of the warfighter support processes. The performance measures will be designed to map to the PMA and SRS to ensure that Army warfighter processes are meeting the objectives of the Army, DoD, and the Federal government.

5.5 Leverage Model

The Leverage Model relates to what is commonly called the "tooth to tail ratio" in the Army. It is the trend towards shifting more resources to the operational Army by optimizing (which really means strategically reducing) the investment in the Institutional Army while maintaining support and sustainment capabilities. One method for gaining the leverage is to unburden the operational commander of management responsibility for selected sustainment functions. An example of this in the Army was the creation of the Installation Management Agency (IMA) that relieves Mission Commanders from installation management responsibilities. The IMA allows operational commanders to focus on missions and combat while garrison commanders focus on the responsibilities of running the bases, posts and stations.

5.6 Enterprise Integration

In Industry and DoD, effective enterprise integration focuses the warfighter support transformation on responsive delivery of support to the operations and mission rather than efficiency as an independent variable. There are several examples of DoD's move towards enterprise integration:

- DoD and each of the Services have significant COTS/ERP implementations on-going.
  - Business Systems Modernization is reengineering the way DLA manages wholesale supplies in DoD.
  - The Army's Logistics Modernization Program is an ERP that is changing the wholesale supply system and integrating with BSM at the national level.
  - The Army's newly developed BFT Aviation (BFTAVN) System is an integration of existing and modified commercial off the- shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf hardware and software used to track both ground and airborne platforms and to provide a dynamic aggregated picture of those platforms.
  - The Maintain, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) System is revolutionizing the ability of the Air Force to maintain aircraft landing gear at the Ogden Logistics Center, one of the Air Forces largest logistics base.
  - The Navy initiated four ERP pilots to investigate the ability of ERP to satisfy its logistics support requirements. The Navy is currently in the process of attempting to converge these pilots into one ERP implementation.
- As companies become involved in more advanced enterprise integration initiatives and continue to add new technologies to their enterprise networks, they face the daunting task of interconnecting a wide array of disparate IT systems. Traditionally, systems were connected on a point-to-point basis as organizations developed customized integrations according to their needs. As the number of systems grew, however, such integration became more complex and difficult to manage. Without a scalable approach to integration, many organizations found their IT infrastructures were becoming increasingly difficult to manage, impeding the implementation of new technologies.

  Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) tools were developed to address these integration problems. With EAI, disparate systems are connected to a single integration server using a repeatable process. Adding a new technology or system is then just a matter of repeating the integration process and

connecting the technology or system to the integration server. In this way, all the applications within an enterprise can communicate and exchange data as needed through the integration server, rather than through customized application-to-application integrations.

- The Defense Acquisition System has institutionalized the requirement to determine the value of all IT investments based on value (business cases) by incorporating it in the rewrite of the DoD 5000. As an example of the benefits of this move to perform transition management based on value, plans for the development and implementation of DIMHRS have a goal to subsume 79 legacy systems, support 3.1M MilPers, and process $93B in annual pay and allowances at significantly less cost.
- Army leadership has recognized the collective magnitude of IT investments, the duplication in capability among the disparate systems, the inherent lack of interoperability among these systems and the inability of these systems to collectively satisfy the department's need for timely information as major issues that degrade Army mission accomplishment. These issues present the background for the Advanced Collaborative Environment (ACE) concept and the solution space that the ACE concept is being developed to address.

6.0 Opportunities

There exists a body of knowledge from recent operational and transformation experiences and a willingness by senior leadership to transform

- Apply sound Change Management principles and Communications to achieve transformation goals
- Establish and institutionalize transformation governance
- Establish benchmarks to gauge performance
- Identify and reprogram funds expended on support functions to operations
- Create the structure that enables the Army to plan and operate as one enterprise, "One Army"
    - All the Components (Active, Reserve and National Guard)
    - All domains
    - Combat and CSS/CSS
    - Operational and Institutional Army

There is an emphasis on the use of common frameworks to guide transformation across the enterprise to:

- Align with the President's Management Agenda
- Realize the DoD Force Transformation Goals
- Achieve the Army Vision & Future Force
- Optimize at the Enterprise Level based upon risk management decisions to sub-optimize at lower levels
- Reduce/eliminate unwanted redundancy in functions, applications, and policies
- Focus investment management

There has been significant progress in mitigating real and perceived constraints to warfighter support transformation implementation

- The DoD decision-making support systems (Acquisition, Joint Capabilities (JSIDS), Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)) are transforming
- There are enterprise application license agreements in place and more being established
- Experience with development of the BEA has provided factual and anecdotal data that supports expanding the choices of enterprise architecture frameworks that can be selected to plan enterprise warfighter support integration.

6.1 Transformation Knowledge and Willingness

DoD and Industry have acquired a great deal of data and experience due to ramp up and transformation of operations and previous large-scale transformation efforts. It is critical that the data and experience is turned into knowledge and benchmarks are developed. This will help to avoid the mistakes of the past and provide a means to gauge the performance of the warfighter support transformation efforts. Factors contributing to the timeliness of this Transformation effort:

- Operations: Lessons Learned in Desert Storm, numerous Peacekeeping operations, Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.
- Transformation: Unit deactivations and re-stationing, military personnel draw-down, industry consolidations and mergers, reaction to the "IT bubble bust".
- Transformation of the Army and DoD are high on the President's Management Agenda.
- Both the Army and DoD force structure / manning are highly visible to the Public and Politicians due to the September 11, 2001 attacks, recent military actions, and the long-term deployment of all components of the Army.
- The Army and the DoD supports the Business Initiative Council (BIC). The BIC was established to provide guidance and direction for warfighter support initiatives for the Army and the DoD. The activities of this office are to identify, evaluate, and implement warfighter support initiatives to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Army and DoD.
- The DoD has a Force Transformation Office organized directly under the Secretary of Defense.

6.2 Common Frameworks to Guide Transformation

1. Section 1004 of Public Law 107.314 (*National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003*) directed the development of the BEA and transition plan by 1 May 2003 to get a handle on financial management in DoD. DoD is developing policy for investment management in the Department IAW the GAO Information Technology Investment Management Model (ITIM).
2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for overseeing development of joint concepts and validating joint warfighting requirements for implementation of the DoD Transformation Guidance. To accomplish this, the Requirements Generation System has been redesigned and renamed the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS establishes an integrated framework to force "jointness" into the evaluation of investments in capability for DoD.

6.3 Mitigating Real and Perceived Implementation Constraints

1. DoD has three primary decision-making support systems; all have been updated this year
    - Defense Acquisition System - How weapon systems, IT, and services are acquired, new 5000 series directive and instruction signed in May 2003.

- The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) - total restructuring of "requirements" process signed in June 2003. Its focus on warfighting capabilities and gaps, analysis to determine what capability gaps to fill, and whether a material or non-material solution is appropriate.
- Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) – MID 913 replaced the former PPBS. The focus of the new system is on resource allocation – providing the warfighter with the best mix of forces, equipment and support attainable under fiscal constraints. It also introduces new emphasis on using performance metrics to focus on output and return on investment. With this new emphasis, DoD is evaluating new tools and approaches for adoption. One such suggested approach is offered by Real Options, proposed by Myron Scholes, Fischer Black, and Robert Merlon who were awarded the 1997 Nobel Prize in economics for their financial-options valuation model. The future defense climate requires legislative relief that will allow for strategic flexibility, organizational adaptability, management of higher degrees of uncertainty and an evaluation tool for alterative paths, valuation metrics, and options.

2. GAO is very critical of DoD's development of the Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA). While it noted that the BEA is DoD's most ambitious enterprise architecture effort, GAO concluded that BEA requires a significant amount of work before it can be used to guide investments in DoD financial management processes. Anecdotal information suggests that the C4ISR architecture framework, designed to visualize operational command and control, may be problematic for enterprise warfighter support integration. This presents AEIOO with an opportunity and challenge to investigate other enterprise architecture and integration frameworks that may prove to be more suitable for depicting end to end, top to bottom warfighter support transformation.

7.0 Conclusions

There are some key conclusions that can be drawn from this strategic environment assessment that will shape the development of the Army Enterprise Integration Strategy, and could potentially impact the Army Campaign Plan that is currently under development:

1. There are several significant threats to successful accomplishment of enterprise integration and transformation of Army warfighter support processes. The most significant of those is the lack of a transformation governance structure that is empowered and focused on integrating the warfighter support processes in the institutional and operational Army into a One Army enterprise. In the current and emerging strategic environment, Future Force operations must leverage Army warfighter support capabilities to enhance its mobility, lethality, and sustainability. Without the necessary governance structure, Army leadership will face significant challenges in accomplishing the Chief of Staff's transformation imperatives.
2. Despite the recent increases in budget authority, the Army must continue to find ways to wring efficiencies out of the warfighter support structure and processes that will generate resources that can be applied to combat and contingency operations. To this end, the Army is already reacting to and leveraging several of the process and technology trends. What is missing is an overarching enterprise integration strategy that prescribes "Who", "What", "When" and "How" to integrate Army processes to enhance Army operational capability. A framework that provides methods, standards, and measures for the performance of the integration must enable the enterprise integration strategy.
3. Transformation of the operational Army has received significant attention and has forged ahead of transformation of warfighter support processes. However, the great strides that have been made in defining and planning the transformation of warfighter support processes at the OSD level present a tremendous opportunity that can be leveraged by the Army. The Chief of Staff has set the Army on an aggressive course towards redefining the Future Army. This course will be outlined in the Army Campaign Plan that is slated for completion in March 2004. There is a window of opportunity to establish enterprise integration and transform Army warfighter support processes as a critical component of the Future Force, but action must begin now.

8.0 Recommendations

- Develop and execute a Change Management and Communications Campaign.
- Obtain commitment of the Army Executive leadership for robust Army transformation governance.
- Develop, execute, and institutionalize methods, standards, and measures that integrate support processes focused on the operational Army.
- **Do it Now!**